The political and social philosophers whose ideas helped form the
modern concept of society and governance have long maintained that people
consciously choose to live in society as part of an implicit bargain – a
‘social contract’. Hobbes characterized life in nature as ‘mean, nasty,
brutish, and short’, and said people live together, and submit to authority as
a form of collective protection from the dangers of an existence in nature.
Rousseau had a more positive view of nature as a beneficial state, from which
people are drawn – not out of fear, but by the promise of even greater benefits
available within society.
The implications of both of these perspectives is that
participation in society—and the requisite constraints on individual
behavior—are not coerced, but are negotiated; that society offers benefits not
available beyond its bounds, which outweigh the restrictions one accepts as
part of membership.
But what happens when it doesn't? What if members of
society, or a subset of them, gain no benefit from their participation?
What if life for some is just as mean, nasty, brutish, and short within the
pale as beyond? What do we who enjoy the benefits of society and its
institutions have the right to expect from those who don’t?
In legal terms, a contract is only enforceable if there is
‘consideration’ for all parties – in other words, each party must gain some
benefit in order to be bound by their obligations under the contract. In that light, what are the implications for our
Social Contract?
For members of a multi-generational underclass, who spend their
lives surrounded by images of an affluent society, but are aware that they will
never experience it – what do they owe to the maintenance of social
order? If they have no visible chance of escape, nor realistic
opportunity to improve their lot through socially-acceptable means—and if the
fabric of the social safety net is so frayed that even maintaining their
marginal existence is increasingly difficult—how should we expect them to
behave?
Is our only answer to increase enforcement actions? In the
absence of an attractive social contract, must we revert to coercion?
In many advanced societies, consistent efforts are made to so
enhance the quality of life that the mere threat of even brief separation from society
is enough to dissuade citizens from behaviors that might lead to
incarceration. But what if safety and security within one’s environment are
little better than within confinement? If there is no carrot, do we have
to resort to larger, more intimidating sticks?
Societal responses to violations of the social contract may
range from warnings, to exile, fines, imprisonment, and in some societies even
capital punishment. But what if these sanctions are imposed arbitrarily,
based on ethnicity, poverty, gender, or any factor other than adherence to
societal norms? If one’s behavior is not the determinant factor for the
imposition of sanctions, what incentive remains for one to inhibit?
Our society has largely abandoned the inner cities, and those
who now inhabit them – as it abandoned their parents and their grandparents
before them. In place of the
reward/punishment regime within which most of us exist, these people have only
varying, randomly imposed degrees of punishment. To evaluate their
behavior by the standards we impose on ourselves as part of a
mutually-beneficial contract, is naïve at best, if not prejudicial and
cynical.
Laws must be enforced.
The most frequent innocent victims of lawlessness within dispossessed communities
are those who share the same conditions that spawn the lawlessness itself. And pervasive crime exacerbates the feeling
of abandonment Protection from
criminals is a primary function of society.
But the way in which that protection is afforded is absolutely critical. It cannot be perceived as being imposed from
outside. And, as importantly, it cannot
be perceived as enforcing a social order from which the governed do not
benefit.
